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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), leaving the detection
procedure to the third partner and thus being immune to all detector side-channel attacks, is very
promising for the construction of high-security quantum information networks. We propose a scheme
to implement MDI-QKD, but with continuous variables instead of discrete ones, i.e., with the source
of Gaussian-modulated coherent states, based on the principle of continuous-variable entanglement
swapping. This protocol not only can be implemented with current telecom components but also has
high key rates compared to its discrete counterpart; thus it will be highly compatible with quantum
networks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), allowing a secret
key between two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob) to
be established [1], has been applied to quantum infor-
mation networks based on the trusted node or relay
[2, 3]. However, in order to construct high-security and -
performance networks, measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD would be a very promising alternative since
it not only removes all detector side-channel attacks, the
most important security loophole of QKD implementa-
tions, by leaving the detection procedure to the untrusted
relay but also supplies excellent performance with current
technology [4–10].
Measurement-device-independent QKD, which is a
time-reversed Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)-based
QKD scheme [11], consists of Alice and Bob respectively
sending single-photon states to the third partner, Char-
lie, who makes a Bell-state measurement (BSM) and
broadcasts his measurement results, and it has been a
big step forward to bridge the gap between the theory
and the real-world implementation of QKD [4]. Based
on the idea of discrete-variable entanglement swapping
and two-photon interference, the BSM can postselect
the entanglement states between Alice and Bob and
does not disclose the information about encodings, so
this protocol allows the legitimate parties to establish
the secure keys, which are independent of the measure-
ment device, and all detection side-channel attacks are
removed by leaving the detection procedure to the third
partner.
As a counterpart, motivated by continuous-variable en-
tanglement swapping [12, 13], here, we propose a scheme
to implement the MDI-QKD with continuous variables
instead of discrete ones, i.e., with the source of Gaussian-
modulated coherent states; thus we can confirm the se-
curity of this protocol by the optimality of Gaussian at-
tacks [14–17]. We show that with respect to this pro-
tocol two different reconciliation strategies, direct recon-
ciliation (DR) and reverse reconciliation (RR), can be
used to extract the secure keys even though this protocol
seems symmetric for Alice and Bob compared to Char-
lie, and both are high performance. The detection side-
channel attacks against continuous-variable QKD, such
as the wavelength attack [18], the calibration attack [19],
the local oscillator (LO) intensity attack [20], and the
saturation attack [21], also have been excluded, and the
expensive and low-detection-efficiency single-photon de-
tectors used by discrete-variable MDI-QKD are also re-
placed by the lower-cost and higher-detection-efficiency
balanced homodyne detectors (BHDs). Hence this proto-
col for continuous-variableMDI-QKD not only can be im-
plemented with current technology but also has high key
rates, like the conventional one-way continuous-variable
(CV) QKD protocol [e.g., the Grosshans-Grangier proto-
col (GG02 protocol) [22, 23]; see details in Ref. [24] and
the references therein).
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe the protocol of continuous-variable MDI-QKD. In
Sec. III, we give the security bounds of this protocol in
DR and RR respectively against one-mode attack. In
Sec. IV, we extend the results of Sec. III to the asym-
metric channel case and discuss the imperfect detections.
Finally, Sec. V is used for the conclusion of this paper.
II. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
This continuous-variable MDI-QKD, whose schematic
setup is shown in Fig. 1, consists of the following four
steps.
1. Preparation. Alice and Bob each prepare coherent
states in the phase space and send them to the third part-
ner, Charlie, simultaneously, as shown in Fig. 1. Here the
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic setup of the continuous-
variable MDI-QKD protocol. BHD: balanced homodyne de-
tector; BS: balanced beam splitter.
input modes can be described as XˆA/B = X
S
A/B + Xˆ
N
A/B
for Alice and Bob, respectively, where XSA/B are classical
encoding variables with centered Gaussian distribution of
zero mean and variance VS and Xˆ
N
A/B are vacuum modes.
For all quadratures Qˆ and Pˆ of coherent states, they are
defined as Xˆ ∈ {Qˆ, Pˆ}. The overall variance V := V (XˆA)
of Alice’s initial mode is given by V = VS+1 in shot-noise
units, where VS is the modulation variance mentioned be-
fore, and here we assume that Bob’s variance of his mode
is the same as Alice’s, which they can agree on before key
distribution without loss of generality [25].
2. Measurement. Charlie combines these two input
modes with a balanced beam splitter (BS) and makes a
continuous-variable BSM [12, 13] on the two modes with
two BHDs shown in Fig. 1, i.e., one port detecting Qˆ
quadrature and the other Pˆ quadrature. Thus he will get
the measurements, for example, QˆA − QˆB and PˆA + PˆB
over the lossless and noiseless channels, up to a multi-
plier of 1/
√
2 introduced by the BS [12, 13]. Then, he
broadcasts these measurement results to Alice and Bob.
Note that the LO used by Charlie is sent by either Al-
ice or Bob, and before that, both Alice and Bob have
defined the same signal-modulation reference frame by
manipulating their respective LO beams (see details in
Appendix A).
3. Parameter estimation and security extraction. Al-
ice and Bob reveal part of their encodings, and based on
Charlie’s measurement results, they estimate the chan-
nel transmissions and excess noises. To establish the cor-
related data and secure keys, either Alice or Bob sub-
tracts her or his encodings from Charlie’s measurement
results. For convenience, we assume that Bob imple-
ments this subtraction procedure since the protocol is
symmetric; that is, Bob will take the data (Qˆ+
√
T2Q
S
B)
and (Pˆ − √T2PSB ), denoted as QˆB′ and PˆB′ , as estima-
tions of Alice’s encodings to establish the secure keys,
where T2 is the estimated channel transmission between
Bob and Charlie. Since Eve does not know Bob’s en-
codings, she does not know Alice’s encodings accurately
either from just the publication of quadratures Qˆ and Pˆ .
Of course, she can learn part of the information from Qˆ
and Pˆ .
4. Data postprocessing. Alice and Bob extract the
secret keys from their raw data using the current error
correction and privacy amplification techniques [26] after
they calculate the secret key rate between them.
III. ESTIMATION OF SECURITY BOUNDS
To estimate the security bounds of our protocol, we
consider the entangling cloner shown in Fig. 2 to bound
Eve’s information. In the security analysis of conven-
tional one-way CVQKD protocols, the collective Gaus-
sian attacks up to an appropriate symmetrization of the
protocols are considered to be the optimal general attacks
[16, 17]. The entangling cloner is the most powerful and
practical example of a collective Gaussian attack [27, 28]
and is shown to be optimal for a single or one-mode chan-
nel [20]. But in two-way protocols, the optimal attack is
not clear with respect to two interaction channels, and
the entangling cloner attack has only been demonstrated
to be optimal in the hybrid two-way protocol [28]. In this
work, we restrict our analysis to two Markovian memory-
less Gaussian channels, which do not interact with each
other and thus can be reduced to a one-mode channel
[29]. Hence, in this sense, the two independent entangling
cloner attacks, one in each of the untrusted channels of
our protocol, are reduced to one-mode attacks and thus
can be taken as the optimal one-mode collective Gaus-
sian attack (the most powerful attack corresponding to
two memory Gaussian channels that interact with each
other is analyzed in another work and is not analyzed in
this paper; see the Note). This attack consists of Eve
interacting on Alice’s and Bob’s modes with her half of
each EPR pair, respectively, and the quantum channels
are replaced by two beam splitters with transmissions T1
and T2, respectively. Then, she collects all the modes to
store them in her quantum memory and makes collective
measurements on these modes to acquire information at
any time during the classical data-postprocessing proce-
dure implemented by Alice and Bob.
As mentioned before, Bob’s recast data are obtained
by subtracting his own encodings from Charlie’s publica-
tions. Before describing them, we first give the expres-
sions for the BSM results Qˆ and Pˆ under the entangling
cloner attack shown in Fig. 2. They can be written as
Qˆ=(
√
T1QˆA+
√
1− T1QˆE1)−(
√
T2QˆB+
√
1− T2QˆE2),
Pˆ =(
√
T1PˆA+
√
1− T1PˆE1)+(
√
T2PˆB+
√
1− T2PˆE2),
(1)
up to the multiplier of 1/
√
2 mentioned before, which
can be incorporated with the left-hand sides of the above
equations. Here, E1 and E2 are Eve’s EPR modes, whose
variances are N1 and N2, respectively. N1 and N2 are
used to simulate the variances of the practical channel
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Entangling cloner attack correspond-
ing to two Markovian memoryless Gaussian channels with no
interactions. Eve interacts Alice’s and Bob’s modes with her
half of each EPR pair, respectively, and stores her ancillary
modes Eˆ
′
1, Eˆ
′′
1 , Eˆ
′
2, Eˆ
′′
2 in her quantum memory to acquire in-
formation by collective measurements at any time of the data-
processing procedure. N1 (N2) denotes the variance of each
mode of the first EPR pair (the second EPR pair). The mode
Eˆ3 ∈ {Qˆ, Pˆ} is the virtual mode disclosed to Eve by Charlie’s
BSM and it can be taken as a classical variable.
excess noises εA and εB, respectively; that is, εA = (1 −
T1)(N1−1)/T1 for the channel between Alice and Charlie,
εB = (1 − T2)(N2 − 1)/T2 for the channel between Bob
and Charlie, and both are referred to their respective
channel inputs. T1 and T2 are the respective channel
transmissions of the channel between Alice or Bob and
Charlie, and both can be estimated in the parameter-
estimation procedure. Then, we can recast Bob’s data
as
QˆB′ =(
√
T1QˆA+
√
1− T1QˆE1)−(
√
T2Qˆ
N
B+
√
1− T2QˆE2),
PˆB′ =(
√
T1PˆA+
√
1− T1PˆE1)+(
√
T2Pˆ
N
B +
√
1− T2PˆE2).
(2)
Since the set of data in Eqs. (2) is a noisy version of Al-
ice’s encodings, restricted to one-mode attack, this pro-
tocol is equivalent to the conventional one-way CVQKD
protocol with heterodyne detection [30]. In this sense,
we can use the conventional standard methods to ana-
lyze its security bounds. Like for one-way CVQKD, two
different strategies of reconciliation, DR and RR, can be
used to extract secure keys. In DR, Alice’s encodings
are taken as the referential raw keys; thus Bob tries to
guess them and reconcile his data to be identical to them
by virtue of the additional classical side information sent
by Alice. In RR Bob’s recast data are taken as the raw
keys; therefore Alice tries to make her encodings iden-
tical to them, requiring Bob to send side information.
Note that Eve’s entangling cloner attacks for these two
reconciliation procedures are different. In DR, Eve just
guesses Alice’s encodings, and Bob’s encodings have no
contributions for her, so restricted to a one-mode attack,
the entangling cloner attack on Bob’s mode is no use to
her except for reducing the mutual information between
Alice and Bob. However, in RR, Eve tries to guess Bob’s
recast data, including not only Alice’s encoding compo-
nent but also the noise component, so she can acquire
information with the help of entangling cloner attacks on
both channels, as shown in Fig. 2.
Before calculating the secret key rates of this protocol
in DR and RR, we first compute the Shannon informa-
tion between Alice and Bob, and then in the following
sections we bound Eve’s information using the standard
method (see [28, 31]) since this protocol is equivalent to
the conventional one-way CVQKD protocol with hetero-
dyne detection [30].
Assuming the symmetry of both quadratures, the mu-
tual information between Alice and Bob can be given by
IAB′ = log2
VB′
VB′ |A
. (3)
Note that they are identical in DR and RR and there is
no multiplier of 1/2 out the front since two quadratures
are used to generate the secure keys, which is the same
case as in conventional one-way CVQKD with heterodyne
detection. The terms VB′ and VB′ |A are the variance and
conditional variance of Bob’s recast data QˆB′ and PˆB′
in Eqs. (2). Since the terms on the right-hand sides of
Eqs. (2) are mutually linearly independent, the variance
VB′ := 〈Qˆ2B′ 〉 = 〈Pˆ 2B′ 〉 (〈QˆB′ 〉 = 〈PˆB′ 〉 = 0) is obtained
by
VB′ = T1V + (1− T1)N1 + T2 + (1− T2)N2 := bv, (4)
and the conditional variance on Alice’s encodings XSA is
given by
VB′ |A = T1 + (1 − T1)N1 + T2 + (1 − T2)N2 := b0, (5)
using the formula of conditional variance defined as [32,
33]
VX|Y = V (X)−
| 〈XY 〉 |2
V (Y )
. (6)
All the variances are in units of shot-noise level. Next, we
calculate the secret key rates between Alice and Bob in
DR and RR, respectively, by bounding Eve’s information.
A. Direct reconciliation
In DR, Charlie’s publication results will disclose some
information, which is equal to giving Eve the virtual
mode Eˆ3 shown in Fig. 2. Hence, Eve’s information
about Alice’s encodings consists of the Shannon infor-
mation IAE3 since XE3 (∈ {Q,P}) is a classical variable
and the Holevo information χAEA . The two kinds of in-
formation may partly contain each other, but we take the
4superposition as zero for simplicity. Therefore, the secret
key rate can be given by
KDR = βIAB′ − IAE3 − χAEA , (7)
where β is the efficiency of reconciliation. The Shan-
non information IAB′ is given by Eq. (3). IAE3 bounds
Eve’s knowledge about Alice’s encodings directly learned
from Charlie’s publication results Q and P , and it can
be taken as the classical information since Charlie’s mea-
surement for each pulse is individual (e.g., Alice and Bob
can wait to send the next signal pulse until they receive
the measurement result of the last pulse). The Holevo
bound χAEA describes Eve’s information obtained from
the entangling cloner shown in Fig. 2.
We first compute IAE3 . Since Eve’s modes E
′′
1 , E
′′
2
can reduce the uncertainty of modes E
′
1 and E
′
2, respec-
tively [34], she can reduce the uncertainty of publication
results Q and P ; i.e., the variance of mode E3 ∈ {Q,P}
conditioned on E
′′
1 , E
′′
2 can be obtained by
VE3|E′′1 ,E
′′
2
= T1V +(1−T1)/N1+T2V +(1−T2)/N2, (8)
using VE1|E′′1
= 1/N1 and VE2|E′′2
= 1/N2 [34], and the
conditional variance VE3|A,E′′1 ,E
′′
2
can also be given by
VE3|A,E′′1 ,E
′′
2
= T1+(1−T1)/N1+T2V +(1−T2)/N2. (9)
So, assuming symmetry of both quadratures, the Shan-
non information IAE3 can be calculated as
IAE3 = log2
VE3|E′′1 ,E
′′
2
VE3|A,E′′1 ,E
′′
2
. (10)
The Holevo information χAEA can be written as
χAEA = S(EA)− S(EA|A), (11)
where EA denotes Eve’s modes E
′
1, E
′′
1 , and S(EA) can
be computed with the symplectic eigenvalues of the co-
variance matrix
γEA(V, V ) =
(
ev1I ϕ1σz
ϕ1σz N1I
)
, (12)
where ϕ1 =
√
T1(N21 − 1) and ev1 = (1 − T1)V + T1N1.
Here ev1 is the variance of mode E
′
1, and the condi-
tional variance on Alice’s encodings is given by e0 =
(1− T1) + T1N1. I and σz are Pauli matrices. The sym-
plectic eigenvalues of this covariance matrix are given by
λ1,2 =
√
∆∓√∆2 − 4D
2
, (13)
where ∆ = e2v1 + N
2
1 − 2ϕ21 and D = (ev1N1 − ϕ21)2.
Hence, the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s state is given
by
S(EA) = G
(
λ1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ2 − 1
2
)
, (14)
where G(x) = (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2 x. S(EA|A)
can be obtained by the conditional covariance matrix
γEA|A = γEA(1, 1), and its symplectic eigenvalues are
given by
λ3,4 =
√
A∓√A2 − 4B
2
, (15)
where A = e20 +N
2
1 − 2ϕ21, B = (e0N1 − ϕ21)2. Thus, the
conditional entropy is
S(EA|A) = G
(
λ3 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ4 − 1
2
)
. (16)
With Eqs. (10) and (11), we can bound Eve’s informa-
tion for DR and then compute the secret key rate KDR
in Eq. (7). We plot it in Fig. 3 for a symmetric channel
case where T1 = T2 and excess noises in each channel are
also identical.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Secret key rates vs transmission dis-
tances between Alice, Charlie, and Bob for DR with symmet-
ric channels. From top to bottom, excess noise is selected as
0, 0.005, 0.01, and 0.015, which are typical values in experi-
ments [35]. Alice and Bob’s modulation variance is set to be
optimal, and the reconciliation efficiency is 0.95, which is an
appropriate value (see [26]). Here, fiber loss is 0.2 dB/km.
From Fig. 3, we can see that this protocol is very sen-
sitive to channel loss and excess noise in DR for the sym-
metric channel case, and transmission distances are lim-
ited to 15 km (3-dB limit), the same as for the one-way
CVQKD protocol with DR, or shorter due to the fact
that Bob’s data contain some modulation vacuum noise,
which is detrimental to him, and Charlie’s BSM discloses
some information to Eve.
5B. Reverse reconciliation
In RR, the secret key rate can be written as
KRR = βIAB′ − IB′E3 − χB′E , (17)
where IAB′ is also given by Eq. (3), IB′E3 describes the
information disclosed by Charlie, and χB′E quantifies
Eve’s Holevo information about Bob’s recast data (QˆB′
or PˆB′ ) by entangling cloner attack. The latter two quan-
tities are calculated as follows.
The information IB′E3 about Bob’s recast data QˆB′
and PˆB′ disclosed by Charlie’s BSM can be written as
IB′E3 = log2
VE3
VE3|B′
. (18)
where there is no factor of 12 , as the previous section men-
tioned. To compute the variance of mode E3 ∈ {Q,P}
and the conditional variance VE3|B′ , we recast the mea-
surement quadrature Qˆ (Pˆ ) in Eqs. (1) as Qˆ = QˆB′ −√
T2QB (Pˆ = PˆB′ +
√
T2PB), so these variances can be
given, respectively, by
VE3 = 〈(Qˆ)2〉 = 〈(Pˆ )2〉
= T1V + (1− T1)N1 + T2V + (1− T2)N2,
(19)
VE3|B′ = T2VS = T2(V − 1). (20)
Then, using the above equations, Eq. (18) can be ob-
tained.
The Holevo information χB′E can be obtained by
χB′E = S(E)− S(E|B
′
), (21)
where E denotes Eve’s modes E
′
1, E
′′
1 , E
′
2, E
′′
2 . S(E)
can be computed with the symplectic eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix,
γE =


ev1I ϕ1σz 0 0
ϕ1σz N1I 0 0
0 0 ev2I ϕ2σz
0 0 ϕ2σz N2I


8×8
, (22)
where ev2 = (1 − T2)V + T2N2 and ϕ2 =
√
T2(N22 − 1).
This covariance matrix can be written as γEA
⊕
γEB , so
S(E) = S(EA)+S(EB), where S(EA) is given by Eq. (14)
and S(EB) is obtained by replacing T1 and N1 with T2
and N2 in Eq. (14). Likewise, S(E|B′) can be calculated
by symplectic eigenvalues of the conditional covariance
matrix γ
Q
B
′ ,P
B
′
E , which can be obtained by [31]
γ
Q
B
′ ,P
B
′
E = γE − σEB′ (XγB′X)MPσTEB′ , (23)
where
σEB′ =


〈QˆE′1QˆB′ 〉 0
0 〈PˆE′1 PˆB′ 〉
〈QˆE′′1 QˆB′ 〉 0
0 〈PˆE′′1 PˆB′ 〉
〈QˆE′2QˆB′ 〉 0
0 〈PˆE′2 PˆB′ 〉
〈QˆE′′2 QˆB′ 〉 0
0 〈PˆE′′2 PˆB′ 〉


=


ξ1I
φ1σz
−ξ2σz
−φ2I

 , (24)
with
ξ1 =
√
T1(1 − T1)(N1 − V ),
φ1 =
√
(1− T1)(N21 − 1),
ξ2 =
√
T2(1 − T2)(N2 − 1),
φ2 =
√
(1− T2)(N22 − 1),
(25)
and γB′ =
(
bv 0
0 bv
)
, X =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. MP stands for the
Moore-Penrose inverse of a matrix. For a straightfor-
ward calculation, the conditional covariance matrix can
be recast as
γ
Q
B
′ ,P
B
′
E =

(ev1 − ξ
2
1
bv
)I (ϕ1− ξ1φ1bv )σz
ξ1ξ2
bv
σz
ξ1φ2
bv
I
(ϕ1− ξ1φ1bv )σz (N1 −
φ21
bv
)I ξ2φ1bv I
φ1φ2
bv
σz
ξ1ξ2
bv
σz
ξ2φ1
bv
I (ev2 − ξ
2
2
bv
)I (ϕ2− ξ2φ2bv )σz
ξ1φ2
bv
I
φ1φ2
bv
σz (ϕ2− ξ2φ2bv )σz (N2 −
φ22
bv
)I

 .
(26)
Calculating the symplectic eigenvalues of a four-mode co-
variance matrix is very challenging, and the standard
method is as follows [31, 36]: first, we denote the four
symplectic eigenvalues as ν1, ν2, ν3 and ν4, which satisfy
∆41 = ν
2
1 + ν
2
2 + ν
2
3 + ν
2
4 ,
∆42 = ν
2
1ν
2
2 + ν
2
1ν
2
3 + ν
2
1ν
2
4 + ν
2
2ν
2
3 + ν
2
2ν
2
4 + ν
2
3ν
2
4 ,
∆43 = ν
2
1ν
2
2ν
2
3 + ν
2
1ν
2
2ν
2
4 + ν
2
1ν
2
3ν
2
4 + ν
2
2ν
2
3ν
2
4 ,
∆44 = ν
2
1ν
2
2ν
2
3ν
2
4 ,
(27)
where ∆4j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) is the jth-order principal minor
of γ
Q
B
′ ,P
B
′
E , which is defined as the sum of the determi-
nants of all the 2j×2j submatrices of the n×n covariance
matrix obtained by deleting n − 2j rows and the corre-
sponding n − 2j columns [36]. Second, after calculating
the principal minors of the conditional covariance matrix,
we can solve Eqs. (27) to get the symplectic eigenvalues
of the four-mode conditional covariance matrix. How-
ever, it is very difficult. But, we can compute S(E|B′)
asymptotically. Note that G(ν−12 ) → log2 eν2 + O(ν−1)
for ν ≫ 1 [28]. This means that for a large variance V
of Alice’s and Bob’s modulated modes and T 6= 0, 1, we
6can use the above formula to compute the Holevo infor-
mation. For a large modulation variance, the asymptotic
eigenvalues of γ
Q
B
′ ,P
B
′
E can be given by
ν1 = N1, ν2 = N2, ν
2
3ν
2
4 =
∆44
ν21ν
2
2
. (28)
Then, S(E|B′) can be obtained by
S(E|B′) = G
(
N1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
N2 − 1
2
)
+ log2
e2ν3ν4
4
.
(29)
Then, the Holevo information χB′E in Eq. (21) can be
attained with above equations.
Hence, we can obtain the secret key rate in RR in
Eq. (17) by substituting Eqs. (3), (18), and (21) into
it. We plot the secure key rate KRR as a function of
transmission distances between Alice, Charlie, and Bob
in Fig. 4 for the symmetric channel case. The perfor-
mance in RR is higher than that in DR, which is analo-
gous to the case of conventional one-way CVQKD, but in
conventional one-way CVQKD the RR protocol has no
loss limit when the channel excess noise is zero. Since
the vacuum noise of Bob’s mode reduces the mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob and Charlie’s BSM dis-
closes some information, the transmission distances are
also very limited, with typical experimental parameters
used in current CVQKD implementations [35], except for
the modulation variance of Alice and Bob, which is set
to be optimal. Note that the calculation of the Holevo
information χB′E in Eq. (21) is for the case of large mod-
ulation variance of Alice and Bob. However, in Appendix
B, we show that even for infinitely strong modulation
and perfect reconciliation efficiency the transmission dis-
tances are still short, and also the improvement is limited.
IV. DISCUSSION
As shown in the previous sections, we set Bob to recast
his data by subtracting his encodings from Charlie’s BSM
results; however, if Alice recasts her data as Bob does
and Bob keeps his encodings, the same results as above
will be obtained. Although the performance is not very
good for symmetric channels, we show that this protocol
will exhibit high performance for asymmetric channels
(T1 6= T2), as shown in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 5, we set Charlie’s BSM relay close to Alice’s
station, for example, 10 m, and find that both DR and
RR have excellent performances over long distances be-
tween Alice, Charlie, and Bob with experimental realistic
conditions. Moreover, if we set Charlie’s BSM relay close
to Bob’s station, the cases are a little more complicated
due to the respective channel excess noises. However,
in this setting, this protocol is very close to the conven-
tional one-way CVQKD protocol except Charlie’s BSM
discloses part of the information to Eve. Therefore, in
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Secret key rates vs transmission dis-
tances between Alice, Charlie, and Bob for RR with symmet-
ric channels. From top to bottom, excess noise is selected as
0, 0.005, 0.01, and 0.015. Alice and Bob’s modulation vari-
ance is also set to be optimal. Fiber loss is 0.2 dB/km, and
the reconciliation efficiency is 0.95.
this sense, for this protocol DR has 3-dB limit, and RR
has no loss limit if there is no channel excess noise and
T2 → 1. We do not show these results in the figure.
Of course, we can reverse the above cases in Fig. 5 to get
high performance with Charlie’s BSM relay close to Bob’s
station just by having Alice recast her data if channels
have excess noise.
Finally, we point out that the imperfections of Char-
lies’s homodyne detections, such as detection efficiency
and electronic noise, can be included in the channel trans-
mission and excess noise, respectively; thus we can not
necessarily consider the imperfections of Charlie’s detec-
tions when computing the secure key rates. However,
these imperfections will reduce the performance of this
protocol rapidly if the BHD has low detection efficiency
and high electronic noise. Hence using highly efficient
BHDs in BSM is necessary to improve the performance
of this continuous-variable MDI-QKD.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we proposed a scheme to realize the idea
of MDI-QKD, with a source of Gaussian-modulated co-
herent states. We showed that this protocol has higher
performance in RR against a one-mode optimal attack
than DR for the symmetric channel case, but both are
limited to short distances; however, for asymmetric chan-
nels both have excellent performances and can be ex-
tended to current distances realized by the conventional
one-way CVQKD. Moreover, the protocol almost exploits
each pulse to generate keys and thus has high key rates
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Secret key rates vs transmission dis-
tances between Alice, Charlie, and Bob for (a) RR and (b)
DR in the asymmetric channel case with the optimal modu-
lation variance. Excess noise are selected as 0 (solid lines),
0.005 (dashed lines), and 0.01 (dotted lines), for both chan-
nels referred to their respective channel transmissions T1 and
T2. Both BSM relays are close to Alice’s station, and the
distance is set to be 10 m. Fiber loss is 0.2 dB/km, and the
reconciliation efficiency is 0.95.
compared to the discrete-variable MDI-QKD. Actually,
this protocol has no basis choice or comparison, and each
pulse except the ones used for parameter estimation con-
tributes to the establishment of secure keys. In addition,
the source can be easily generated with coherent light,
and the whole protocol can be implemented experimen-
tally with current technology, although the LO interfer-
ence will be a little complicated. We hope to seek other
methods to solve the problem of pulse synchronization
and the reference frame calibration in future research.
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Appendix A: Defining the reference frame
In this appendix, we discuss how to synchronize the
pulses and define the reference frame between Alice, Bob,
and Charlie by the manipulation of LO. The basic idea
is that, if we can measure the phase difference of two LO
beams sent by Alice and Bob, respectively, we can add
this phase difference in one party’s modulation of his or
her signal beam, and thus the two signal modulations
of Alice and Bob are implemented in the same reference
frame. Since LO is a strong classical beam, we can com-
bine two LO beams in a balanced beam splitter so that
they interfere with each other; then we can measure one
port’s interference output to get the phase difference of
the two LO beams. The schematic setup is shown in
Fig. 6.
Alice
LO
LO
Bob
Charlie
2 
2
2 sin( ) !" 
2
1 cos( ) !" BS1
BS2
PD
PD
FIG. 6. (Color online) Schematic setup for measuring phase
difference between two classical LO beams. PD: photodetec-
tor; BS1, BS2: beam splitters; all beam splitters in the figure
are balanced, or 50:50.
In this protocol, we have Alice send the LO beam to
Charlie, who then splits it into two beams with a bal-
anced beam splitter for his two balanced homodyne de-
tectors and uses them to measure the quadratures Qˆ and
Pˆ . First, Alice splits her LO beam into two beams, one
sent to Charlie and the other to Bob. Then, Bob splits
the received LO beam from Alice and his own LO beam
into two beams, respectively, and combines them with
BS1 and BS2 so they interfere with each other, as shown
in Fig. 6. Then, we use each photodetector on one port
of both BS1 and BS2, to detect the intensity of interfered
beams. Note that, we add a pi/2 phase on Bob’s one split
LO beam in order to accurately measure the phase dif-
ference. We denote the amplitude of Alice’s LO beam
that interferes with Bob’s as αeiθA and denote Bob’s LO
beam as αeiθB , provided that both of them have iden-
tical intensities. Relative to the LO beams, Alice’s and
Bob’s classical signal beams are phase modulated into
αAS e
i(θA+φA) and αBS e
i(θB+φB), respectively, before atten-
uating the quantum level. αAS and α
B
S are their respec-
tive signal beam intensities, and φA, φB are modulated
phases. Then, when two LO beams interfere with BS1,
the amplitude of one port can be written as
β1 =
αeiθA + αeiθB√
2
=
√
2αe
i(θA+θB)
2 cos
(
θA − θB
2
)
.
(A1)
8The PD output of BS1 is obtained by
|β1|2 = 2|α|2 cos2
(
θA − θB
2
)
= |α|2[1 + cos(θA − θB)].
(A2)
Likewise, the PD output of BS2 can be attained as
|β2|2= |α|2{1+cos[θA−(θB+pi/2)]} = |α|2[1+sin(θA−θB)].
(A3)
With Eqs. (A2) and (A3), we can accurately compute
the phase difference ∆θ := θA − θB of Alice’s and Bob’s
LO beams. When Bob modulates his signal beam, he
adds the phase difference ∆θ and the initial phase φB
together as the modulated phase. Thus, the amplitude of
Bob’s signal beam can be written as αBS e
i(θB+φB+∆θ) =
αBS e
i(θA+φB) , which has been defined in the same refer-
ence frame as Alice’s.
However, realizing the above strategy experimentally
may be complicated, and we just give a simple theoret-
ical method and demonstrate the possibility of imple-
menting this whole protocol of continuous-variable MDI-
QKD. Other strategies to solve the problem of pulse syn-
chronization and the reference frame calibration might
exist. We note that in Refs. [37–39], homodyne detec-
tors and LO beams are not needed to make the BSM in
continuous-variable entanglement swapping; however, we
are not sure whether their method of BSM is suitable for
this protocol. Finally, we point out that, to relieve the
emitters’ burden and preserve the symmetry of Alice and
Bob, this procedure of synchronization and the reference
frame calibration can be implemented by Charlie with-
out affecting the security of this protocol. That means
Alice and Bob both send their LO beams to Charlie, who
measures the phase difference of the two beams and then
adds it to the signal beam of either Alice or Bob by mod-
ulation.
Appendix B: Asymptotic key rate for RR with
infinitely strong modulation
In Sec. III B, we obtained the Holevo information
χB′E in Eq. (21) for RR for the case of large modula-
tion variance of Alice and Bob. Using appropriate exper-
imental parameters, e.g., a finite reconciliation efficiency
β = 0.95, and optimizing the modulation variance, we
show that the transmission distances in the symmetric
channel case for RR are also limited like in DR due to
the vacuum noise of Bob’s mode, which is different from
the conventional one-way CVQKD as mentioned before.
However, in this appendix, we point out that even for in-
finitely strong modulation and perfect reconciliation ef-
ficiency, the transmission distances are still limited, as
shown in Fig. 7.
Figure 7 depicts the asymptotic key rate with infinitely
large modulation variance for RR in the symmetric chan-
nel case, and we can see that the improvement in the
achievable key rate is limited with respect to the mod-
ulation variance of Alice and Bob. In addition, we can
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Asymptotic key rates vs transmission
distances between Alice, Charlie, and Bob for RR in the sym-
metric channel case with infinitely large modulation variance
and perfect reconciliation efficiency, i.e., V → ∞ and β = 1.
From top to bottom, excess noise is selected as 0, 0.005, 0.01,
and 0.015. Fiber loss is 0.2 dB/km.
easily check that the maximum transmission distance in
the asymptotic case is extended by only about 2 km com-
pared to the one in the case with V = 40 and β = 1. This
means that the asymptotic calculation of the eigenval-
ues and Holevo information χB′E in Eqs. (28) and (21),
respectively, is also applicable to the case of experimen-
tal realization with an appropriately large modulation
variance. Finally, we point out that the asymptotic key
rates for other cases in DR and RR with symmetric or
asymmetric channels can also be easily obtained using
the above method, i.e., by setting V → ∞ and β = 1
in the calculation for the key rates. For the purpose of
experimental realization, i.e., using the experimentally
realistic parameters, we do not give their results here.
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